Why is it so hard to prove that e+pi or e*pi is irrational/rational?
The reason why it is so hard to prove is actually very easy to answer. These constants, identities, and variations being referred to in this post, and others like it, all lay embedded in a far deeper substrate than current mathematics has yet explored.
Mathematics has been, and always shall be my ‘first love’, and it has provided for me all of these years. I am not criticising mathematics in any way. It is my firm belief that mathematics will overcome this current situation and eventually be quite able to examine these kinds of questions in a much more expansive and deeper way.
We need to extend our examination of mathematical knowledge, both in depth and in scope, out farther and in deeper than numbers (sets and categories as well – even more below) have yet done. I’ll introduce you to a pattern you may have already noticed in the current stage of our mathematical endeavour.
We all know there are numbers which lay outside of Q which we call Irrational numbers. There are also numbers which lay outside of R which we call Imaginary numbers. They have both been found, because the domain of questioning exceeded the range of answers being sought within the properties each of those numbers. This pattern continues in other ways, as well.
We also know there are abstractions and/or extensions of Complex numbers where the ‘air starts to get thin’ and mathematical properties start to ‘fade away’: Quaternions, Octonians, Sedenions,…
This pattern continues in other ways: Holors, for example, which extend and include mathematical entities such as Complex numbers, scalars, vectors, matrices, tensors, Quaternions, and other hypercomplex numbers, yet are still capable of providing a different algebra which is consistent with real algebra.
The framing of our answers to mathematical questions is also evolving. Logic was, for example, limited to quite sophisticated methods that all were restricted to a boolean context. Then we found other questions which led to boundary, multi-valued, fuzzy, and fractal logics, among a few others I haven’t mentioned yet.
Even our validity claims are evolving. We are beginning to ask questions which require answers which transcend relationship properties such as causality, equivalence, and inference in all of their forms. Even the idea of a binary relationship is being transcended into finitary versions (which I use in my work). There are many more of these various patterns which I may write about in the future.
They all have at least one thing in common: each time we extend our reach in terms of scope or depth, we find new ways of seeing things which we saw before and/or see new things which were before not seen.
There are many ‘voices’ in this ‘mathematical fugue’ which ‘weaves’ everything together: they are the constants, variations, identities, and the relationships they share with each other.
The constants e, π, i, ϕ, c, g, h all denote or involve ‘special’ relationships of some kind. Special in the sense that they are completely unique.
For example:
- e is the identity of change (some would say proportion, but that’s not entirely correct).
- π is the identity of periodicity. There’s much more going on with
than simply being a component of arc or, in a completely different context, a component of area…
These relationships actually transcend mathematics. Mathematics ‘consumes’ their utility (making use of those relationships), but they cannot be ‘corralled in’ as if they were ‘horses on the farm’ of mathematics. Their uniqueness cannot be completely understood via equivalence classes alone.
- They are ubiquitous and therefore not algebraic.
- They are pre-nascent to number, equivalence classes, and validity claims and are therefore not rational.
These are not the only reasons.
It’s also about WHERE they are embedded in the knowledge substrate compared to the concept of number, set, category…. They lay more deeply embedded in that substrate.
The reason why your question is so hard for mathematics to answer is, because our current mathematics is, as yet, unable to decide. We need to ‘see’ these problems with a more complete set of ‘optics’ that will yield them to mathematical scrutiny.
Getting Hypertension About Hyperreals
(Links below)
This system is quite interesting if we allow ourselves to talk about the qualities of infinite sets as if we can know their character completely. The problem is, any discussion of an infinite set includes their definition which MAY NOT be the same as any characterisation which they may actually have.
Also, and more importantly, interiority as well as exteriority are accessible without the use of this system. These ‘Hyperreals’ are an ontological approach to epistemology via characteristics/properties we cannot really know. There can be no both true and verifiable validity claim in this system.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJWe1BunlXI (Part1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBmJWEQTl1w (Part2)
“How much knowledge does the understanding in words contain?”
Words are symbolic indications and/or conveyors of meaning and are not that meaning in themselves.
Meaning is found, stored, and manipulated in our minds. This is why different languages are capable, in varying degrees of usefulness, to convey meaning which is very similar to that found via the symbols of any other.
It It is also the reason why there are words indicating meaning that are not found in other languages; or, if found in a different language, the other language requires more of its own structure, dynamics, and resonance to convey the same meaning.
For example: the words ‘déjà vu’ in French are found in German ‘schon gesehen’ and in English ‘already seen’, but these phrases do not convey the full meaning found in the French version. To counter this deficit, their meaning in other languages must be ‘constructed’ out of or ‘fortified’ by the careful use of longer strings of symbols. This additional construction and/or fortification may even fail at times. This is often where the word phrase from a different language is simply added to the language in which the concept is missing.
This same situation is found in the literature of many languages. The words used to convey meaning are condensed and may contain more meaning than is usually the case. In this regard, even the person reading/hearing the words may not possess the competence necessary to catch this condensed meaning in its fullness.
Mathematical expressions, albeit more precise, are also indications of meaning. They are more robust in their formulation, but at ever-increasing depth or scope, even they may fail to reliably or conveniently convey meaning.
Our understanding of what words mean is not always accurate, but where our mutual understanding of the meaning of words overlaps, and the degree to which they overlap, is where their meaning can be shared.
Our own personal understanding of words is measured by our ability to apply their meaning in our lives.
There is also a false meme, which I would like to clarify.
“Knowledge is Power!”
It is wrongly said that ‘Knowledge is power’. The truth is another: Knowledge is the measure of usefulness of what we understand and is the only true expression of its ‘power’.
The value of Knowledge is found in its usefulness and not in its possession.
Which questions does Category Theory help us answer?
Another chapter in my attempt to help break the ‘spell’ of the category theoretical ‘ontologicisation’ of our world.
This may seem to many as a purely academic question, but we all need to realise that all of what we consider a modern way of thinking rests upon ‘mental technologies’ such as Category Theory.
Academics are literally taking the ‘heart’ out of how our world is being defined!
If we don’t pay attention, humanity will continue losing its way.
Category theory, although very powerful, is no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge. Category theory will tell you how to tie your shoes, but it can’t tell you why you are motivated to do so.
Lateral Numbers – How ‘Imaginary Numbers’ May Be Understood
First, allow me to rename theses numbers during the remainder of this post to lateral numbers, in accordance to the naming convention as was recommended by Gauss. I have a special reason for using this naming convention. It will later become apparent why I’ve done this.
If we examine lateral numbers algebraically, a pattern emerges:
When we raise lateral numbers to higher powers, the answers do not get higher and higher in value like other numbers do. Instead, a pattern emerges after every 4th multiplication. This pattern never ceases.
All other numbers, besides laterals, have a place on what currently is called the ‘Real number line’.
I qualify the naming of the Real Numbers, because even their conceptualisation has come into question by some very incisive modern mathematicians. That is a very ‘volatile’ subject for conventional mathematicians and would take us off on a different tangent, so I’ll leave that idea for a different post.
If we look for laterals on any conventional Real number line, we will never ‘locate’ them. They are found there, but we need to look at numbers differently in order to ‘see’ them.
Lateral numbers solve one problem in particular: to find a number, which when multiplied by itself, yields another negative number.
Lateral numbers ‘unify’ the number line with the algebraic pattern shown above.
2 is positive and, when multiplied by itself, yields a positive number. It maintains direction on the number line.
When one of the numbers (leaving squaring briefly) being multiplied is negative, the multiplication yields a negative number. The direction ‘flips’ 180° into the opposite direction.
Multiplying -2 by -2 brings us back to the positive direction, because of the change resulting in multiplying by a negative number, which always flips our direction on the number line.
So, it appears as if there’s no way of landing on a negative number, right? We need a number that only rotates 90°, instead of the 180° when using negative numbers. This is where lateral numbers come into play.
If we place another lateral axis perpendicular to our ‘Real’ number line, we obtain the desired fit of geometry with our algebra.
When we multiply our ‘Real’ number 1 by i, we get i algebraically, which geometrically corresponds to a 90° rotation from 1 to i.
Now, multiplying by i again results in i squared, which is -1. This additional 90° rotation equals the customary 180° rotation when multiplying by -1 (above).
We may even look at this point as if we were viewing it down a perpendicular axis of the origin itself (moving in towards the origin from our vantage point, through the origin, and then out the back of our screen).
[If we allow this interpretation, we can identify the ‘spin’ of a point around the axis of its own origin! The amount of spin is determined by how much the point moves laterally in terms of i.
We may even determine in which direction the rotation is made. I’ll add how this is done to this post soon.]
Each time we increase our rotation by multiplying by a factor of i, we increase our rotation another 90°, as seen here:
and,
The cycle repeats itself on every 4th power of i.
We could even add additional lateral numbers to any arbitrary point. This is what I do in my knowledge representations of holons. For example a point at say 5 may be expressed as any number of laterals i, j, k,… simply by adding or subtracting some amount of i, j, k,…:
5 + i + j +k +…
Or better as:
[5, i, j, k,…]
Seeing numbers in this fashion makes a point n-dimensional.
Strictly Speaking Can’t! Natural Language Won’t?
Physics is only complex, because it’s in someone’s interest to have it that way. The way to understanding, even if you don’t understand science, was paved with words. Even if those words led only to a symbolic form of understanding.
Common ordinary language is quite capable of explaining physics. Mathematics is simply more precise than common language. Modern Mathematics pays the price for that precision by being overly complex and subservient to causal and compositional relations. These are limitations that metaphysics and philosophy do not have.
Words in language have a structure that mathematics alone will never see as it looks for their structure and dynamics in the wrong places and in the wrong ways. Modern pure mathematics lacks an underlying expression of inherent purpose in its ‘tool set’.
With natural language we are even able to cross the ‘event horizon’ into interiority (where unity makes its journey through the non-dual into the causal realm). It is a place where mathematics may also ‘visit’ and investigate, but only with some metaphysical foundation to navigate with. The ‘landscape’ is very different there… where even time and space ‘behave’ (manifest) differently. Yet common language can take us there! Why? It’s made of the ‘right stuff’!
The mono-logical gaze with its incipient ontological foundation, as found in (modern) pure mathematics, is too myopic. That’s why languages such as Category Theory, although subtle and general in nature, even lose their way. They can tell us how we got there, but none can tell us why we wanted to get there in the first place!
It’s easy to expose modern corporate science’s (mainstream) limitations with this limited tool set – you need simply ask questions like: “What in my methodology inherently expresses why am I looking in here?” (what purpose) or “What assumptions am I making that I’m not even aware of?” or “Why does it choose to do that? and you’re already there where ontology falls flat on its face.
Even questions like these are met with disdain, intolerance and ridicule (the shadow knows it can’t see them and wills to banish what it cannot)! And that’s where science begins to resemble religion (psyence).
Those are also some of the reasons why philosophers and philosophy have almost disappeared from the mainstream. I’ll give you a few philosophical hints to pique your interest.
Why do they call it Chaos Theory and not Cosmos Theory?
Why coincidence and not synchronicity?
Why entropy and not centropy?
…
Why particle and not field?
(many more examples…)
Does Division By Zero Have Meaning?
Yes, in knowledge representation, the answer is the interior of a holon.
Ontologies go ‘out of scope’ when entering interiority. The common ontological representation via mathematical expression is 1/0.
When we ‘leave’ the exterior ontology of current mathematics by replacing number with relation, we enter the realm of interiority.
In the interior of relation, we access the epistemological aspects of any relation.
As an aide to understanding – Ontology answers questions like: ‘What?’, ‘Who?’, ‘Where?’, and ‘When?’. Epistemology answers questions like: ‘Why?’ and ‘How do we know?’
In vortex mathematics 1/0 is known as ‘entering the vortex’.
There are other connections to some new developments in mathematics involving what is called ‘inversive geometry’.
Example: (oversimplified for clarity)
If we think of say… the point [x, y, z] in space, we may assign x, y, and z any number value except where one of these coordinates gets involved in division where 0 is not allowed (up to this point in common mathematics) as a denominator. x/z is not allowed when z=0, for example.
Now, if we are dealing with interiority, numbers are replaced by relationships, such as [father, loves, son].
What if the son has died? Is the relationship still valid?
The answer to this question lies within the interior of those involved in the relation.
Are sets, in an abstract sense, one of the most fundamental objects in contemporary mathematics?
Yes and no.
The equivalence relation lies deeper within the knowledge representation and it’s foundation.
There are other knowledge prerequisites which lie even deeper within the knowledge substrate than the equivalence relation.
The concepts of a boundary, of quantity, membership, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and relation are some examples.
Limits of Category Theory and Semiotics
They are wonderful tools to explain much of our world, but lack ‘The Right Stuff’ to handle the metaphysical underpinnings of anything near a Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language , or a Philosophy of Learning.
This is, because Category Theory specialises on roughly half of the Noosphere. It does a wonderful job on exteriority, but cannot sufficiently describe nor comprehensively access interiority.
Therefore, as is the case with Semiotics, has limited metaphysical value with respect to philosophy in general.
For example: philosophies of mind, language, or learning are not possible using only category theoretical tools and/or semiotics.
Here is an example of one attempt which fails in this regard: http://nickrossiter.org.uk/proce…
(and here: VisualizationFoundationsIEEE)
Here are two problems (of many) in the paper:
4.4.2 Knowledge is the Terminal Object of Visualisation states:
“The ultimate purpose of the visualisation process is to gain Knowledge of the original System. When this succeeds (when the diagram commutes) then the result is a ‘truth’ relationship between the Knowledge and the System. When this process breaks down and we fail to deduce correct conclusions then the diagram does not commute.”
I want to also comment on Figure 3 (which also exposes missing or false premises in the paper), but I will wait until I have discussed the assertions in the quote above which the authors of this paper reference, accept, and wish to justify/confirm.
1) The purpose of a representation is NOT to gain knowledge; rather, to express knowledge. Also, truth has nothing to do with knowledge except when that value is imposed upon it for some purpose. Truth value is a value that knowledge may or not ‘attend’ (participate in).
1a) The ‘truth value’ of the System (‘system’ is a false paradigm [later, perhaps] and a term that I also vehemently disagree with) does not always enter into the ‘dialogue’ between any knowledge that is represented and the observer interpreting that knowledge.
2) The interpretation of a representation is not to “deduce correct conclusions”; rather, to understand the meaning (semantics and epistemology) of what is represented. ‘Correct’ understanding is not exclusive to understanding nor is it necessary or sufficient for understanding a representation, because that understanding finds expression in the observer.
2a) ‘Correct’, as used in this paragraph, is coming from the outside (via the choice of which data [see Fig. 3] is represented to the observer) and may have no correspondence (hence may never ever commute) whatever to what that term means for the observer.
The authors are only talking about ontologies. That is a contrived and provincial look at the subject they are supposing to examine.
There may (and usually are) artefacts inherent in any collection and collation of data. The observer is forced to make ‘right’ (‘correct’) conclusions from that data which those who collected it have ‘seeded’ (tainted) with their own volition.
‘System’ (systematising) anything is Reductionism. This disqualifies the procedure at its outset.
They are proving essentially that manipulation leads to a ‘correct’ (their chosen version) representation of a ‘truth’ value.
I could tie my shoelaces into some kind of knot and think it were a ‘correct’ way to do so if the arrows indicate this. This is why paying too much attention to a navigation system can have one finding themselves at the bottom of a river!
The paper contains assumptions that are overlooked and terms that are never adequately defined! How can you name variables without defining their meaning? They then serve no purpose and must be removed from domain of discourse.
Categorical structures are highly portable, but they can describe/express only part of what is there. There are structure, dynamics, and resonance that ontology and functionalism completely turns a blind eye to.
The qualities of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Clarity,… (even Falsehood, Badness, Ugliness, Obscurity,…) can be defined and identified within a knowledge representation if the representation is not restricted to ontology alone.
In order to express these qualities in semiotics and category theory, they must first be ontologised funtionally (reduced). Trying to grasp them with tools restricted to semiotics and category theory is like grasping into thin air.
That is actually the point I’m trying to make. Category Theory, and even Semiotics, each have their utility, but they are no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge.
Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities #19 (Inverse Awareness)
Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities
#19 The Inverse Awareness Relation
The Inverse Awareness Relation establishes a fundamental relationship in our universe:
Is Real World Knowledge More Valuable Than Fictional Knowledge?
No.
Here an excerpt from a short summary of a paper I am writing that provides some context to answer this question:
What Knowledge is not:
Knowledge is not very well understood so I’ll briefly point out some of the reasons why we’ve been unable to precisely define what knowledge is thus far. Humanity has made numerous attempts at defining knowledge. Plato taught that justified truth and belief are required for something to be considered knowledge.
Throughout the history of the theory of knowledge (epistemology), others have done their best to add to Plato’s work or create new or more comprehensive definitions in their attempts to ‘contain’ the meaning of meaning (knowledge). All of these efforts have failed for one reason or another.
Using truth value and ‘justification’ as a basis for knowledge or introducing broader definitions or finer classifications can only fail.
I will now provide a small set of examples of why this is so.
Truth value is only a value that knowledge may attend.
Knowledge can be true or false, justified or unjustified, because
knowledge is the meaning of meaning
What about false or fictitious knowledge? [Here’s the reason why I say no.]
Their perfectly valid structure and dynamics are ignored by classifying them as something else than what they are. Differences in culture or language even make no difference, because the objects being referred to have meaning that transcends language barriers.
Another problem is that knowledge is often thought to be primarily semantics or even ontology based. Both of these cannot be true for many reasons. In the first case (semantics):
There already exists knowledge structure and dynamics for objects we cannot or will not yet know.
The same is true for objects to which meaning has not yet been assigned, such as ideas, connections and perspectives that we’re not yet aware of or have forgotten. Their meaning is never clear until we’ve become aware of or remember them.
In the second case (ontology): collations that are fed ontological framing are necessarily bound to memory, initial conditions of some kind and/or association in terms of space, time, order, context, relation,… We build whole catalogues, dictionaries and theories about them: Triads, diads, quints, ontology charts, neural networks, semiotics and even the current research in linguistics are examples.
Even if an ontology or set of them attempts to represent intrinsic meaning, it can only do so in a descriptive ‘extrinsic’ way. An ontology, no matter how sophisticated, is incapable of generating the purpose of even its own inception, not to mention the purpose of the objects to which it corresponds.
The knowledge is not coming from the data itself, it is always coming from the observer of the data, even if that observer is an algorithm.
Therefore ontology-based semantic analysis can only produce the artefacts of knowledge, such as search results, association to other objects, ‘knowledge graphs’ like Cayley,…
Real knowledge precedes, transcends and includes our conceptions, cognitive processes, perception, communication, reasoning and is more than simply related to our capacity of acknowledgement.
In fact knowledge cannot even be completely systematised; it can only be interacted with using ever increasing precision.
[For those interested, my summary is found at: A Precise Definition of Knowledge – Knowledge Representation as a Means to Define the Meaning of Meaning Precisely: http://bit.ly/2pA8Y8Y
Does Knowledge Become More Accurate Over Time?
Change lies deeper in the knowledge substrate than time.
Knowledge is not necessarily coupled with time, but it can be influenced by it. It can be influenced by change of any kind: not only time.
Knowledge may exist in a moment and vanish. The incipient perspective(s) it contains may change. Or the perspective(s) that it comprises may resist change.
Also, knowledge changes with reality and vice versa.
Time requires events to influence this relationship between knowledge and reality.
Knowledge cannot be relied upon to be a more accurate expression of reality, whether time is involved or not, because the relationship between knowledge and reality is not necessarily dependent upon time, nor is there necessarily a coupling of the relationship between knowledge and reality. The relationships of ‘more’ and ‘accurate’ are also not necessarily coupled with time.
Example: Eratosthenes calculated the circumference of the Earth long before Copernicus published. The ‘common knowledge’ of the time (Copernicus knew about Eratosthenes, but the culture did not) was that the Earth was flat.
Heurist.me (Carey G. Butler) 