What do all things have in common?

Mathesis Universalis

Why is it so hard to prove that e+pi or e*pi is irrational/rational?

The reason why it is so hard to prove is actually very easy to answer. These constants, identities, and variations being referred to in this post, and others like it, all lay embedded in a far deeper substrate than current mathematics has yet explored.

Mathematics has been, and always shall be my ‘first love’, and it has provided for me all of these years. I am not criticising mathematics in any way. It is my firm belief that mathematics will overcome this current situation and eventually be quite able to examine these kinds of questions in a much more expansive and deeper way.

We need to extend our examination of mathematical knowledge, both in depth and in scope, out farther and in deeper than numbers (sets and categories as well – even more below) have yet done. I’ll introduce you to a pattern you may have already noticed in the current stage of our mathematical endeavour.

We all know there are numbers which lay outside of Q which we call Irrational numbers. There are also numbers which lay outside of R which we call Imaginary numbers. They have both been found, because the domain of questioning exceeded the range of answers being sought within the properties each of those numbers. This pattern continues in other ways, as well.

We also know there are abstractions and/or extensions of Complex numbers where the ‘air starts to get thin’ and mathematical properties start to ‘fade away’: Quaternions, Octonians, Sedenions,…

This pattern continues in other ways: Holors, for example, which extend and include mathematical entities such as Complex numbers, scalars, vectors, matrices, tensors, Quaternions, and other hypercomplex numbers, yet are still capable of providing a different algebra which is consistent with real algebra.

The framing of our answers to mathematical questions is also evolving. Logic was, for example, limited to quite sophisticated methods that all were restricted to a boolean context. Then we found other questions which led to boundary, multi-valued, fuzzy, and fractal logics, among a few others I haven’t mentioned yet.

Even our validity claims are evolving. We are beginning to ask questions which require answers which transcend relationship properties such as causality, equivalence, and inference in all of their forms. Even the idea of a binary relationship is being transcended into finitary versions (which I use in my work). There are many more of these various patterns which I may write about in the future.

They all have at least one thing in common: each time we extend our reach in terms of scope or depth, we find new ways of seeing things which we saw before and/or see new things which were before not seen.

There are many ‘voices’ in this ‘mathematical fugue’ which ‘weaves’ everything together: they are the constants, variations, identities, and the relationships they share with each other.

The constants e, π, i, ϕ, c, g, h  all denote or involve ‘special’ relationships of some kind. Special in the sense that they are completely unique.

For example:

  • e is the identity of change (some would say proportion, but that’s not entirely correct).
  • π is the identity of periodicity. There’s much more going on with \pi than simply being a component of arc or, in a completely different context, a component of area

These relationships actually transcend mathematics. Mathematics ‘consumes’ their utility (making use of those relationships), but they cannot be ‘corralled in’ as if they were ‘horses on the farm’ of mathematics. Their uniqueness cannot be completely understood via equivalence classes alone.

  • They are ubiquitous and therefore not algebraic.
  • They are pre-nascent to number, equivalence classes, and validity claims and are therefore not rational.

These are not the only reasons.

It’s also about WHERE they are embedded in the knowledge substrate compared to the concept of number, set, category…. They lay more deeply embedded in that substrate.

The reason why your question is so hard for mathematics to answer is, because our current mathematics is, as yet, unable to decide. We need to ‘see’ these problems with a more complete set of ‘optics’ that will yield them to mathematical scrutiny. 

Question on Quora


Is the P=NP Problem an NP Problem?

What I’m going to say is going to be unpopular, but I cannot reconcile my own well-being without giving you an answer to this problem from my perspective.

My only reason for reluctantly writing this, knowing what kind of reaction I could receive is, because I abhor that some of the best minds on our planet are occupying themselves with this problem. It pains me to no end to see humanity squandering its power for a problem that, as it is currently framed, is unanswerable. It goes further than this though. There will come a time when questions such as this one will be cast upon the junk heap of humanity’s growth throughout history. It will take its rightful place along such ideas as phrenology.

Here’s why I say this:

The problem is firmly and completely embedded in Functional Reductionism. I say this, because the problem’s framing requires us to peel away the contextual embedding of the problems for which it is supposed to clarify.

This is just one of its problems. Here’s another:

Since the data for this problem (and those like it) are themselves algorithms, they are compelled to be functionally reduced versions of mind problem solving (varying types of heuristics and decision problems) which reduces the problem’s causal domain and its universe of discourse even further. How can a specification based upon functionally reduced data be again used as data for the problem’s solution in the first place?

That means that this problem has no independent existence nor causal efficacy. Everywhere I have looked at this problem, the definitions of NP-Hard and NP-Complete do not lead to proving anything useful. We cannot ‘generalise’ the mind by reducing it to some metric of complexity. Complexity is also not how the universe works as Occam’s Razor[1] shows.

I am prepared to defend my position should someone have the metal to test me on this. Another thing: I wish I could have left this alone, but we all need to wake up to this nonsense.

[1] http://bit.ly/2GHbRkW How Occam’s Razor Works

[Quora] http://bit.ly/2EuRdP3


Getting Hypertension About Hyperreals

HyperReals(Links below)

This system is quite interesting if we allow ourselves to talk about the qualities of infinite sets as if we can know their character completely. The problem is, any discussion of an infinite set includes their definition which MAY NOT be the same as any characterisation which they may actually have.

Also, and more importantly, interiority as well as exteriority are accessible without the use of this system. These ‘Hyperreals’ are an ontological approach to epistemology via characteristics/properties we cannot really know. There can be no both true and verifiable validity claim in this system.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJWe1BunlXI (Part1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBmJWEQTl1w (Part2)


Knowledge Representation – Holographic Heart Torus

Holographic Heart Torus

Holographic Heart Torus by Ryan Cameron on YouTube


Knowledge Representation – Fractal Torus 1

Fractal Torus 1 by Ryan Cameron on YouTube


“How much knowledge does the understanding in words contain?”

hermandadblanca_universo-mente-fractal-geometria-sagrada

Words are symbolic indications and/or conveyors of meaning and are not that meaning in themselves.

Meaning is found, stored, and manipulated in our minds. This is why different languages are capable, in varying degrees of usefulness, to convey meaning which is very similar to that found via the symbols of any other.

déjà vu 01

It It is also the reason why there are words indicating meaning that are not found in other languages; or, if found in a different language, the other language requires more of its own structure, dynamics, and resonance to convey the same meaning.

dèja vu 02

For example: the words ‘déjà vu’ in French are found in German ‘schon gesehen’ and in English ‘already seen’, but these phrases do not convey the full meaning found in the French version. To counter this deficit, their meaning in other languages must be ‘constructed’ out of or ‘fortified’ by the careful use of longer strings of symbols. This additional construction and/or fortification may even fail at times. This is often where the word phrase from a different language is simply added to the language in which the concept is missing.

This same situation is found in the literature of many languages. The words used to convey meaning are condensed and may contain more meaning than is usually the case. In this regard, even the person reading/hearing the words may not possess the competence necessary to catch this condensed meaning in its fullness.

Mathematical expressions, albeit more precise, are also indications of meaning. They are more robust in their formulation, but at ever-increasing depth or scope, even they may fail to reliably or conveniently convey meaning.

dèja vu 03

Our understanding of what words mean is not always accurate, but where our mutual understanding of the meaning of words overlaps, and the degree to which they overlap, is where their meaning can be shared.

Our own personal understanding of words is measured by our ability to apply their meaning in our lives.

There is also a false meme, which I would like to clarify.

“Knowledge is Power!”

It is wrongly said that ‘Knowledge is power’. The truth is another: Knowledge is the measure of usefulness of what we understand and is the only true expression of its ‘power’.

The value of Knowledge is found in its usefulness and not in its possession.

My Quora Answer


Which questions does Category Theory help us answer?

Category 02

Another chapter in my attempt to help break the ‘spell’ of the category theoretical ‘ontologicisation’ of our world.

This may seem to many as a purely academic question, but we all need to realise that all of what we consider a modern way of thinking rests upon ‘mental technologies’ such as Category Theory.

Academics are literally taking the ‘heart’ out of how our world is being defined!
If we don’t pay attention, humanity will continue losing its way.

Category theory is a wonderful and powerful tool; nevertheless category theory, with all of its utility, is purely ontological. It can masterfully answer questions such as ‘Who?’, ‘What?’, and ‘How?’.

Category 01

However; it is regretfully inadequate to form a comprehensive representation of knowledge, for it lacks expression of epistemological value, which are the very reasons for is use. Epistemology is about answering the questions of ‘Why?’, ‘What does it mean?’, ‘What is my purpose?’,…
Answers to questions of this kind are implicitly supplied by us during our consumption of the utility afforded by category theory. We often are so beguiled by this power of categorical expression that we don’t realise that is we ourselves who bring the ‘missing elements’ to what it offers as an expression of knowledge.
It does a wonderful job with exteriority (ontology), but cannot sufficiently describe nor comprehensively access interiority (epistemology). Therefore, it has limited metaphysical value with respect to philosophy in general.

Interiority 08

Philosophies of mind, of language, or of learning are not comprehensive using only category theoretical tools.
Categorical structures are highly portable, but they can describe/express only part of what is there. There are structures, dynamics, and resonance that the ontology and functionalism in category theory completely turns a blind eye to.
More general than category theory is knowledge representation. It includes and surpasses category theory in many areas, both in scope and depth, but in particular: knowledge representation includes not just the ontological aspects of what we know, it goes further to describe the epistemological as well.
The qualities of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Clarity,… can be defined and identified within a knowledge representation if the representation is not restricted to ontology. When category theory is used for the purpose of defining qualia, the objects must first be ontologised and functionally reduced. Trying to grasp them with tools restricted to category theory (or even semiotics) is like grasping into thin air.

 

Category theory, although very powerful, is no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge. Category theory will tell you how to tie your shoes, but it can’t tell you why you are motivated to do so.