The reason why it is so hard to prove is actually very easy to answer. These constants, identities, and variations being referred to in this post, and others like it, all lay embedded in a far deeper substrate than current mathematics has yet explored.
Mathematics has been, and always shall be my ‘first love’, and it has provided for me all of these years. I am not criticising mathematics in any way. It is my firm belief that mathematics will overcome this current situation and eventually be quite able to examine these kinds of questions in a much more expansive and deeper way.
We need to extend our examination of mathematical knowledge, both in depth and in scope, out farther and in deeper than numbers (sets and categories as well – even more below) have yet done. I’ll introduce you to a pattern you may have already noticed in the current stage of our mathematical endeavour.
We all know there are numbers which lay outside of Q which we call Irrational numbers. There are also numbers which lay outside of R which we call Imaginary numbers. They have both been found, because the domain of questioning exceeded the range of answers being sought within the properties each of those numbers. This pattern continues in other ways, as well.
We also know there are abstractions and/or extensions of Complex numbers where the ‘air starts to get thin’ and mathematical properties start to ‘fade away’: Quaternions, Octonians, Sedenions,…
This pattern continues in other ways: Holors, for example, which extend and include mathematical entities such as Complex numbers, scalars, vectors, matrices, tensors, Quaternions, and other hypercomplex numbers, yet are still capable of providing a different algebra which is consistent with real algebra.
The framing of our answers to mathematical questions is also evolving. Logic was, for example, limited to quite sophisticated methods that all were restricted to a boolean context. Then we found other questions which led to boundary, multi-valued, fuzzy, and fractal logics, among a few others I haven’t mentioned yet.
Even our validity claims are evolving. We are beginning to ask questions which require answers which transcend relationship properties such as causality, equivalence, and inference in all of their forms. Even the idea of a binary relationship is being transcended into finitary versions (which I use in my work). There are many more of these various patterns which I may write about in the future.
They all have at least one thing in common: each time we extend our reach in terms of scope or depth, we find new ways of seeing things which we saw before and/or see new things which were before not seen.
There are many ‘voices’ in this ‘mathematical fugue’ which ‘weaves’ everything together: they are the constants, variations, identities, and the relationships they share with each other.
The constants e, π, i, ϕ, c, g, h all denote or involve ‘special’ relationships of some kind. Special in the sense that they are completely unique.
- e is the identity of change (some would say proportion, but that’s not entirely correct).
- π is the identity of periodicity. There’s much more going on with than simply being a component of arc or, in a completely different context, a component of area…
These relationships actually transcend mathematics. Mathematics ‘consumes’ their utility (making use of those relationships), but they cannot be ‘corralled in’ as if they were ‘horses on the farm’ of mathematics. Their uniqueness cannot be completely understood via equivalence classes alone.
- They are ubiquitous and therefore not algebraic.
- They are pre-nascent to number, equivalence classes, and validity claims and are therefore not rational.
These are not the only reasons.
It’s also about WHERE they are embedded in the knowledge substrate compared to the concept of number, set, category…. They lay more deeply embedded in that substrate.
The reason why your question is so hard for mathematics to answer is, because our current mathematics is, as yet, unable to decide. We need to ‘see’ these problems with a more complete set of ‘optics’ that will yield them to mathematical scrutiny.
April 25, 2018 | Categories: Holors, Insight, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Mathematics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Understanding, Wisdom | Tags: insight, knowledge, learning, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Philosophy Of Mind, understanding, Universal Constants, wisdom | Leave a comment
What I’m going to say is going to be unpopular, but I cannot reconcile my own well-being without giving you an answer to this problem from my perspective.
My only reason for reluctantly writing this, knowing what kind of reaction I could receive is, because I abhor that some of the best minds on our planet are occupying themselves with this problem. It pains me to no end to see humanity squandering its power for a problem that, as it is currently framed, is unanswerable. It goes further than this though. There will come a time when questions such as this one will be cast upon the junk heap of humanity’s growth throughout history. It will take its rightful place along such ideas as phrenology.
Here’s why I say this:
The problem is firmly and completely embedded in Functional Reductionism. I say this, because the problem’s framing requires us to peel away the contextual embedding of the problems for which it is supposed to clarify.
This is just one of its problems. Here’s another:
Since the data for this problem (and those like it) are themselves algorithms, they are compelled to be functionally reduced versions of mind problem solving (varying types of heuristics and decision problems) which reduces the problem’s causal domain and its universe of discourse even further. How can a specification based upon functionally reduced data be again used as data for the problem’s solution in the first place?
That means that this problem has no independent existence nor causal efficacy. Everywhere I have looked at this problem, the definitions of NP-Hard and NP-Complete do not lead to proving anything useful. We cannot ‘generalise’ the mind by reducing it to some metric of complexity. Complexity is also not how the universe works as Occam’s Razor shows.
I am prepared to defend my position should someone have the metal to test me on this. Another thing: I wish I could have left this alone, but we all need to wake up to this nonsense.
 http://bit.ly/2GHbRkW How Occam’s Razor Works
This system is quite interesting if we allow ourselves to talk about the qualities of infinite sets as if we can know their character completely. The problem is, any discussion of an infinite set includes their definition which MAY NOT be the same as any characterisation which they may actually have.
Also, and more importantly, interiority as well as exteriority are accessible without the use of this system. These ‘Hyperreals’ are an ontological approach to epistemology via characteristics/properties we cannot really know. There can be no both true and verifiable validity claim in this system.
March 29, 2018 | Categories: Big Data, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Language, Learning, Mathematics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Semantics, Wisdom | Tags: insight, knowledge, Knowledge Representation, learning, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy Of Mind, Semantics, understanding | Leave a comment
March 11, 2018 | Categories: Fractals, Holons, Holors, Hyperbolic Geometry, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Language, Learning, Linguistics, Mathematics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Semantic Web, Semantics, Understanding, Wisdom | Tags: knowledge, Language, learning, Philosophy, understanding | 1 Comment
Yes and no.
The equivalence relation lies deeper within the knowledge representation and it’s foundation.
There are other knowledge prerequisites which lie even deeper within the knowledge substrate than the equivalence relation.
The concepts of a boundary, of quantity, membership, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and relation are some examples.
September 9, 2017 | Categories: Insight, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Language, Learning, Linguistics, Mathematics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Metaphysics, Noosphere, Philosophy, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Semantic Web, Semantics | Tags: knowledge, Language, learning, Linguistics, Logica Generalis, Logica Universalis, Mathematica Generalis, Mathematica Universalis, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Philosophy, understanding | Leave a comment
They are wonderful tools to explain much of our world, but lack ‘The Right Stuff’ to handle the metaphysical underpinnings of anything near a Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language , or a Philosophy of Learning.
This is, because Category Theory specialises on roughly half of the Noosphere. It does a wonderful job on exteriority, but cannot sufficiently describe nor comprehensively access interiority.
Therefore, as is the case with Semiotics, has limited metaphysical value with respect to philosophy in general.
For example: philosophies of mind, language, or learning are not possible using only category theoretical tools and/or semiotics.
Here is an example of one attempt which fails in this regard:
(and here: VisualizationFoundationsIEEE)
Here are two problems (of many) in the paper:
4.4.2 Knowledge is the Terminal Object of Visualisation states:
“The ultimate purpose of the visualisation process is to gain Knowledge of the original System. When this succeeds (when the diagram commutes) then the result is a ‘truth’ relationship between the Knowledge and the System. When this process breaks down and we fail to deduce correct conclusions then the diagram does not commute.”
I want to also comment on Figure 3 (which also exposes missing or false premises in the paper), but I will wait until I have discussed the assertions in the quote above which the authors of this paper reference, accept, and wish to justify/confirm.
1) The purpose of a representation is NOT to gain knowledge; rather, to express knowledge. Also, truth has nothing to do with knowledge except when that value is imposed upon it for some purpose. Truth value is a value that knowledge may or not ‘attend’ (participate in).
1a) The ‘truth value’ of the System (‘system’ is a false paradigm [later, perhaps] and a term that I also vehemently disagree with) does not always enter into the ‘dialogue’ between any knowledge that is represented and the observer interpreting that knowledge.
2) The interpretation of a representation is not to “deduce correct conclusions”; rather, to understand the meaning (semantics and epistemology) of what is represented. ‘Correct’ understanding is not exclusive to understanding nor is it necessary or sufficient for understanding a representation, because that understanding finds expression in the observer.
2a) ‘Correct’, as used in this paragraph, is coming from the outside (via the choice of which data [see Fig. 3] is represented to the observer) and may have no correspondence (hence may never ever commute) whatever to what that term means for the observer.
The authors are only talking about ontologies. That is a contrived and provincial look at the subject they are supposing to examine.
There may (and usually are) artefacts inherent in any collection and collation of data. The observer is forced to make ‘right’ (‘correct’) conclusions from that data which those who collected it have ‘seeded’ (tainted) with their own volition.
‘System’ (systematising) anything is Reductionism. This disqualifies the procedure at its outset.
They are proving essentially that manipulation leads to a ‘correct’ (their chosen version) representation of a ‘truth’ value.
I could tie my shoelaces into some kind of knot and think it were a ‘correct’ way to do so if the arrows indicate this. This is why paying too much attention to a navigation system can have one finding themselves at the bottom of a river!
The paper contains assumptions that are overlooked and terms that are never adequately defined! How can you name variables without defining their meaning? They then serve no purpose and must be removed from domain of discourse.
Categorical structures are highly portable, but they can describe/express only part of what is there. There are structure, dynamics, and resonance that ontology and functionalism completely turns a blind eye to.
The qualities of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Clarity,… (even Falsehood, Badness, Ugliness, Obscurity,…) can be defined and identified within a knowledge representation if the representation is not restricted to ontology alone.
In order to express these qualities in semiotics and category theory, they must first be ontologised funtionally (reduced). Trying to grasp them with tools restricted to semiotics and category theory is like grasping into thin air.
That is actually the point I’m trying to make. Category Theory, and even Semiotics, each have their utility, but they are no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge.
August 29, 2017 | Categories: Category Theory, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Linguistics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metaphysics, Noosphere, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Reductionism, Semantic Web, Semantics, Semiology, Semiotics, Understanding, Wisdom | Tags: Category Theory, insight, knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Language, learning, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Reductionism, Search, Semantic Search, Semantic Web, Semantics, Semiology, Semiotics, understanding, wisdom | Leave a comment
Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities
#19 The Inverse Awareness Relation
The Inverse Awareness Relation establishes a fundamental relationship in our universe:
Macro Awareness =
Which essentially state:
The closer awareness is in some way to an entity, the more depth and the less scope it discerns.
The farther awareness is in some way to an entity, the more scope and the less depth it discerns.
(Be careful, this idea of closeness is not the same as distance.)
May 15, 2017 | Categories: Discernment, Holons, Holors, Hyperbolic Geometry, Identities, Insight, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Language, Learning, Linguistics, Mathesis Generalis, Mathesis Universalis, Metamathematics, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, Semantic Web, Semantics, Understanding, Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities, Variations, Wisdom | Tags: knowledge, Language, learning, Linguistics, LogicaUniversalis, Mathesis Universalis, Philosophia Universalis, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Learning, Philosophy Of Mind, understanding | Leave a comment