What do all things have in common?

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Strictly Speaking Can’t! Natural Language Won’t?

Werner Heisenberg - on Language of Mathematics

Physics is only complex, because it’s in someone’s interest to have it that way. The way to understanding, even if you don’t understand science, was paved with words. Even if those words led only to a symbolic form of understanding.

Common ordinary language is quite capable of explaining physics. Mathematics is simply more precise than common language. Modern Mathematics pays the price for that precision by being overly complex and subservient to causal and compositional relations. These are limitations that metaphysics and philosophy do not have.

Words in language have a structure that mathematics alone will never see as it looks for their structure and dynamics in the wrong places and in the wrong ways. Modern pure mathematics lacks an underlying expression of inherent purpose in its ‘tool set’.

With natural language we are even able to cross the ‘event horizon’ into interiority (where unity makes its journey through the non-dual into the causal realm). It is a place where mathematics may also ‘visit’ and investigate, but only with some metaphysical foundation to navigate with. The ‘landscape’ is very different there… where even time and space ‘behave’ (manifest) differently. Yet common language can take us there! Why? It’s made of the ‘right stuff’!

The mono-logical gaze with its incipient ontological foundation, as found in (modern) pure mathematics, is too myopic. That’s why languages such as Category Theory, although subtle and general in nature, even lose their way. They can tell us how we got there, but none can tell us why we wanted to get there in the first place!

It’s easy to expose modern corporate science’s (mainstream) limitations with this limited tool set – you need simply ask questions like: “What in my methodology inherently expresses why am I looking in here?” (what purpose) or “What assumptions am I making that I’m not even aware of?” or “Why does it choose to do that? and you’re already there where ontology falls flat on its face.

Even questions like these are met with disdain, intolerance and ridicule (the shadow knows it can’t see them and wills to banish what it cannot)! And that’s where science begins to resemble religion (psyence).

Those are also some of the reasons why philosophers and philosophy have almost disappeared from the mainstream. I’ll give you a few philosophical hints to pique your interest.

Why do they call it Chaos Theory and not Cosmos Theory?
Why coincidence and not synchronicity?
Why entropy and not centropy?

Why particle and not field?
(many more examples…)


Does Division By Zero Have Meaning?

Yes, in knowledge representation, the answer is the interior of a holon.

Ontologies go ‘out of scope’ when entering interiority. The common ontological representation via mathematical expression is 1/0.

When we ‘leave’ the exterior ontology of current mathematics by replacing number with relation, we enter the realm of interiority.

In the interior of relation, we access the epistemological aspects of any relation.

As an aide to understanding – Ontology answers questions like: ‘What?’, ‘Who?’, ‘Where?’, and ‘When?’. Epistemology answers questions like: ‘Why?’ and ‘How do we know?’

In vortex mathematics 1/0 is known as ‘entering the vortex’.

There are other connections to some new developments in mathematics involving what is called ‘inversive geometry’.

Example: (oversimplified for clarity)

If we think of say… the point [x, y, z] in space, we may assign x, y, and z any number value except where one of these coordinates gets involved in division where 0 is not allowed (up to this point in common mathematics) as a denominator. x/z is not allowed when z=0, for example.

Now, if we are dealing with interiority, numbers are replaced by relationships, such as [father, loves, son].

What if the son has died? Is the relationship still valid?

The answer to this question lies within the interior of those involved in the relation.


Are sets, in an abstract sense, one of the most fundamental objects in contemporary mathematics?

Equivalence Relation

Yes and no.

The equivalence relation lies deeper within the knowledge representation and it’s foundation.

There are other knowledge prerequisites which lie even deeper within the knowledge substrate than the equivalence relation.

The concepts of a boundary, of quantity, membership, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and relation are some examples.

http://bit.ly/2wPV7RN


Limits of Category Theory and Semiotics

Category Theory 01

They are wonderful tools to explain much of our world, but lack ‘The Right Stuff’ to handle the metaphysical underpinnings of anything near a Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language , or a Philosophy of Learning.

This is, because Category Theory specialises on roughly half of the Noosphere. It does a wonderful job on exteriority, but cannot sufficiently describe nor comprehensively access interiority.

Interiority Exteriority

Therefore, as is the case with Semiotics, has limited metaphysical value with respect to philosophy in general.

Semiotics 2

Semiotics

For example: philosophies of mind, language, or learning are not possible using only category theoretical tools and/or semiotics.

Here is an example of one attempt which fails in this regard: http://nickrossiter.org.uk/proce…

(and here: VisualizationFoundationsIEEE)

Here are two problems (of many) in the paper:

4.4.2 Knowledge is the Terminal Object of Visualisation states:

“The ultimate purpose of the visualisation process is to gain Knowledge of the original System. When this succeeds (when the diagram commutes) then the result is a ‘truth’ relationship between the Knowledge and the System. When this process breaks down and we fail to deduce correct conclusions then the diagram does not commute.”

I want to also comment on Figure 3 (which also exposes missing or false premises in the paper), but I will wait until I have discussed the assertions in the quote above which the authors of this paper reference, accept, and wish to justify/confirm.

1) The purpose of a representation is NOT to gain knowledge; rather, to express knowledge. Also, truth has nothing to do with knowledge except when that value is imposed upon it for some purpose. Truth value is a value that knowledge may or not ‘attend’ (participate in).

1a) The ‘truth value’ of the System (‘system’ is a false paradigm [later, perhaps] and a term that I also vehemently disagree with) does not always enter into the ‘dialogue’ between any knowledge that is represented and the observer interpreting that knowledge.

2) The interpretation of a representation is not to “deduce correct conclusions”; rather, to understand the meaning (semantics and epistemology) of what is represented. ‘Correct’ understanding is not exclusive to understanding nor is it necessary or sufficient for understanding a representation, because that understanding finds expression in the observer.

2a) ‘Correct’, as used in this paragraph, is coming from the outside (via the choice of which data [see Fig. 3] is represented to the observer) and may have no correspondence (hence may never ever commute) whatever to what that term means for the observer.

The authors are only talking about ontologies. That is a contrived and provincial look at the subject they are supposing to examine.

There may (and usually are) artefacts inherent in any collection and collation of data. The observer is forced to make ‘right’ (‘correct’) conclusions from that data which those who collected it have ‘seeded’ (tainted) with their own volition.

‘System’ (systematising) anything is Reductionism. This disqualifies the procedure at its outset.

They are proving essentially that manipulation leads to a ‘correct’ (their chosen version) representation of a ‘truth’ value.

I could tie my shoelaces into some kind of knot and think it were a ‘correct’ way to do so if the arrows indicate this. This is why paying too much attention to a navigation system can have one finding themselves at the bottom of a river!

The paper contains assumptions that are overlooked and terms that are never adequately defined! How can you name variables without defining their meaning? They then serve no purpose and must be removed from domain of discourse.

Categorical structures are highly portable, but they can describe/express only part of what is there. There are structure, dynamics, and resonance that ontology and functionalism completely turns a blind eye to.

The qualities of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Clarity,… (even Falsehood, Badness, Ugliness, Obscurity,…) can be defined and identified within a knowledge representation if the representation is not restricted to ontology alone.

In order to express these qualities in semiotics and category theory, they must first be ontologised funtionally (reduced). Trying to grasp them with tools restricted to semiotics and category theory is like grasping into thin air.

That is actually the point I’m trying to make. Category Theory, and even Semiotics, each have their utility, but they are no match for the challenge of a complete representation of knowledge.


Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities #19 (Inverse Awareness)

Inverse Square
Universal Constants, Variations, and Identities
#19 The Inverse Awareness Relation

The Inverse Awareness Relation establishes a fundamental relationship in our universe:

Micro Awareness = \dfrac{1}{scope}

and

Macro Awareness = \dfrac{1}{depth}
or

\dfrac {Micro Awareness}{Macro Awareness} = \dfrac{depth}{scope}

Which essentially state:

The closer awareness is in some way to an entity, the more depth and the less scope it discerns.

The farther awareness is in some way to an entity, the more scope and the less depth it discerns.

(Be careful, this idea of closeness is not the same as distance.)


Is Real World Knowledge More Valuable Than Fictional Knowledge?

hermandadblanca_universo-mente-fractal-geometria-sagrada

No.

Here an excerpt from a short summary of a paper I am writing that provides some context to answer this question:

What Knowledge is not:

Knowledge is not very well understood so I’ll briefly point out some of the reasons why we’ve been unable to precisely define what knowledge is thus far. Humanity has made numerous attempts at defining knowledge. Plato taught that justified truth and belief are required for something to be considered knowledge.

Throughout the history of the theory of knowledge (epistemology), others have done their best to add to Plato’s work or create new or more comprehensive definitions in their attempts to ‘contain’ the meaning of meaning (knowledge). All of these efforts have failed for one reason or another.

Using truth value and ‘justification’ as a basis for knowledge or introducing broader definitions or finer classifications can only fail.

I will now provide a small set of examples of why this is so.

Truth value is only a value that knowledge may attend.

Knowledge can be true or false, justified or unjustified, because

knowledge is the meaning of meaning

What about false or fictitious knowledge? [Here’s the reason why I say no.]

Their perfectly valid structure and dynamics are ignored by classifying them as something else than what they are. Differences in culture or language even make no difference, because the objects being referred to have meaning that transcends language barriers.

Another problem is that knowledge is often thought to be primarily semantics or even ontology based. Both of these cannot be true for many reasons. In the first case (semantics):

There already exists knowledge structure and dynamics for objects we cannot or will not yet know.

The same is true for objects to which meaning has not yet been assigned, such as ideas, connections and perspectives that we’re not yet aware of or have forgotten. Their meaning is never clear until we’ve become aware of or remember them.

In the second case (ontology): collations that are fed ontological framing are necessarily bound to memory, initial conditions of some kind and/or association in terms of space, time, order, context, relation,… We build whole catalogues, dictionaries and theories about them: Triads, diads, quints, ontology charts, neural networks, semiotics and even the current research in linguistics are examples.

Even if an ontology or set of them attempts to represent intrinsic meaning, it can only do so in a descriptive ‘extrinsic’ way. An ontology, no matter how sophisticated, is incapable of generating the purpose of even its own inception, not to mention the purpose of the objects to which it corresponds.

The knowledge is not coming from the data itself, it is always coming from the observer of the data, even if that observer is an algorithm.

Therefore ontology-based semantic analysis can only produce the artefacts of knowledge, such as search results, association to other objects, ‘knowledge graphs’ like Cayley,…

Real knowledge precedes, transcends and includes our conceptions, cognitive processes, perception, communication, reasoning and is more than simply related to our capacity of acknowledgement.

In fact knowledge cannot even be completely systematised; it can only be interacted with using ever increasing precision.

[For those interested, my summary is found at: A Precise Definition of Knowledge – Knowledge Representation as a Means to Define the Meaning of Meaning Precisely: http://bit.ly/2pA8Y8Y


Does Knowledge Become More Accurate Over Time?

Change lies deeper in the knowledge substrate than time.

Knowledge is not necessarily coupled with time, but it can be influenced by it. It can be influenced by change of any kind: not only time.

Knowledge may exist in a moment and vanish. The incipient perspective(s) it contains may change. Or the perspective(s) that it comprises may resist change.

Also, knowledge changes with reality and vice versa.

Time requires events to influence this relationship between knowledge and reality.

Knowledge cannot be relied upon to be a more accurate expression of reality, whether time is involved or not, because the relationship between knowledge and reality is not necessarily dependent upon time, nor is there necessarily a coupling of the relationship between knowledge and reality. The relationships of ‘more’ and ‘accurate’ are also not necessarily coupled with time.

Example: Eratosthenes calculated the circumference of the Earth long before Copernicus published. The ‘common knowledge’ of the time (Copernicus knew about Eratosthenes, but the culture did not) was that the Earth was flat.